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Introduction 
James Kisor is a Vietnam War veteran who served on active duty 
in the Marine Corps from 1962 to 1966.1 During his years of service, 
Mr. Kisor experienced several contacts with snipers, occasional mortar 
rounds, and enemy attacks while on search operations.2 As a result of 
the trauma of combat, Mr. Kisor suffers from post-traumatic stress 
disorder (“PTSD”), as do eleven percent of male Vietnam War veter–
ans.3 Although PTSD’s symptoms have been described under different 
names for hundreds of years, Mr. Kisor and his fellow Vietnam veterans 
were the first American veterans to be diagnosed with this condition.4 
But despite returning home from Vietnam in 1966, Mr. Kisor’s PTSD 
did not qualify him for disability benefits through the Department of 
 
1. Kisor v. Shulkin, 869 F.3d 1360, 1361 (2017), vacated sub nom. Kisor v. 
Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019). 
2. Id. 
3. PTSD and Vietnam Veterans: A Lasting Issue 40 Years Later, U.S. 
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs: Agent Orange Newsletter (Summer 
2015), https://www.publichealth.va.gov/exposures/publications/agent-
orange/agent-orange-summer-2015/nvvls.asp [https://perma.cc/63AF-SJ6K] 
(last updated June 22, 2016). Seven percent of female Vietnam War 
veterans likewise suffer from PTSD. Id.  
4. Id. 
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Veterans Affairs until 2007, more than forty years after he returned 
from the war.5 
As much as Mr. Kisor’s story tells of the challenges that veterans 
face when attempting to secure benefits for PTSD and other 
psychological conditions, his story also brought to the Supreme Court 
of the United States a long-awaited challenge to the Court’s increas–
ingly deferential treatment of administrative decisions. Specifically, Mr. 
Kisor’s story gave rise to the appropriate context in which the Court 
could definitively affirm or overrule the long-standing judicial-deference 
rule under which courts must defer to an agency’s interpretation of the 
agency’s own ambiguous regulation unless the interpretation is “plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation”6—also known as 
Seminole Rock or Auer deference.7 The Supreme Court took up Mr. 
Kisor’s challenge to this rule in Kisor v. Wilkie8 after the Federal 
Circuit applied the deference rule in a way that denied Mr. Kisor the 
earliest possible effective date for his PTSD-related disability benefits.9 
The extent to which courts defer to agency interpretations of their 
own regulations bears on our daily lives more than one might expect. 
Regulations often have a more direct role in defining our legal rights 
than statutes passed by Congress.10 Take Mr. Kisor for instance. An 
agency’s interpretation of its own regulation, not a Congressional act, 
was the dispositive factor in determining whether he was entitled to 
disability benefits for his PTSD.  
The beginning of the twentieth century brought into being the 
current order of administrative law, known as the “appellate review 
model.”11 Under the appellate review model, federal courts review an 
agency’s decisions as an appellate court would review a trial court’s 
decisions.12 By 1945, it was a “‘common sense’ idea” that an agency 
occupied a superior position, compared to a court, to determine what 
 
5. Kisor v. McDonald, No. 14-2811, 2016 WL 337517, at *1 (Vet. App., Jan. 
27, 2016). 
6. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). 
7. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (2019). 
8. Id.  
9. See generally Kisor v. Shulkin, 869 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017), vacated 
sub nom. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (finding no error in the Board’s 
interpretation of 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(1)). 
10. John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to 
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612, 614–15 
(1996). 
11. Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of 
the Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 
939, 965 (2011). 
12. Id. at 940, 953. 
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it meant when it promulgated a rule, and how it could best effectuate 
its purposes under a given rule.13 The Court first expressed that position 
in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Co.14 and confirmed it fifty years later 
in Auer v. Robbins.15 
In Seminole Rock, a crushed-stone manufacturer challenged a 
regulation promulgated by the Administrator of the Office of Price 
Administration under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.16 The 
regulation imposed a wartime “price ‘freeze,’” restricting the price 
sellers could charge to the prices that they charged in March 1942.17 
This general regulation was modified by more specific “refinements and 
modifications.”18 One of these refinements was Maximum Price 
Regulation No. 188, which covered the crushed stone at issue.19 The 
question before the Court was whether the manufacturer was charging 
higher prices for its stone than it did in March 1942.20 The Court began 
its analysis by setting forth the proper standard of review. Because the 
Court was reviewing a regulation, it “must necessarily look to the 
administrative construction of the regulation if the meaning of the 
words used is in doubt.”21 The Court then noted that although congre–
ssional intent or constitutional principles may be relevant when 
choosing between multiple interpretations, “the ultimate criterion is the 
administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight 
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”22 As 
a result, a court’s “only tools” in interpreting a regulation “are the plain 
words of the regulation and any relevant interpretations of the 
[agency].”23 After determining that the regulation at issue was suscep–
tible to three different interpretations, the Court turned to an agency 
bulletin that the Administrator issued to wholesalers and retailers, 
which explained how the highest price should be determined.24 The 
 
13. Manning, supra note 10, at 614. 
14. 325 U.S. 410 (1945). 
15. 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
16. 325 U.S. at 411–12. 
17. Id. at 413. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 413–14. 
22. Id. at 414. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 417.  
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Court consequently adopted the interpretation most consistent with the 
Administration’s guidance.25 
Half a decade later, in Auer v. Robbins,26 Justice Scalia wrote the 
opinion for a unanimous Court re-affirming the rule of Seminole Rock. 
The Auer Court deferred to the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of 
his own regulations regarding whether employees were entitled to over-
time pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). Because 
the Secretary interpreted his own regulation, the Court focused its 
analysis on whether the interpretation was “plainly erroneous or incon–
sistent with the regulation.”27 Directly at issue was whether the 
employees were paid on a “salary basis” or were considered “‘bona fide 
executive, administrative, or professional’ employees” within the 
meaning of the regulation.28 Satisfying these requirements would disen–
title the employees to overtime pay under the FLSA. Under the FLSA 
and the Secretary’s regulations, however, employees who were otherwise 
paid on a salary basis were still entitled to overtime pay if their 
compensation was subject to a reduction based on the quality or 
quantity of their work.29 But pay deductions for disciplinary reasons 
was an exception to this exception. The respondent-employees argued 
that the Secretary’s application of this disciplinary exception was an 
“unreasonable interpretation of the statutory exemption” because 
public-sector employees have fewer alternatives for discipline.30 The 
Secretary, on the other hand, argued that employees subject to pay 
adjustments for disciplinary reasons “do not deserve exempt status” 
because they are not “true ‘executive, administrative, or professional’ 
employees.”31 According to the Secretary, true executive, admin–
istrative, and professional employees are not disciplined by “piecemeal 
deductions” in pay.32 
The Court began its analysis by first citing to Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,33 in which the Court 
had recently held that courts must defer to an agency’s permissible 
 
25. Id. at 418–19. 
26. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).  
27. Id. at 461 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 
U.S. 332, 359 (1989)). 
28. Id. at 455. 
29. Id. at 456. 
30. Id. at 457. 
31. Id. at 456. 
32. Id. 
33. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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interpretation of an ambiguous statute.34 Specifically, the Court stated, 
“[b]ecause Congress has not ‘directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue,’ we must sustain the Secretary’s approach so long as it is ‘based 
on a permissible construction of the statute.’”35 Although the 
respondent-employees advanced an interpretation different from that of 
the Secretary, the Court concluded that the language of the regulation 
did not compel the respondent-employees’ interpretation.36 The Court 
deferred to the Secretary’s interpretation because the salary-basis test 
was “a creature of the Secretary’s own regulations,” and consequently, 
the Secretary’s interpretation was “controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous 
or inconsistent with the regulation.’”37 The Secretary’s interpretation 
“easily met” the “plainly erroneous” standard because the regulation 
comfortably bore the meaning the Secretary assigned to it.38 
The respondent-employees made one last attempt to strike down 
the Secretary’s interpretation, arguing that it was not subject to 
deference because it was advanced in a legal brief.39 The Court swiftly 
rejected this argument, however, emphasizing that “[t]he Secretary’s 
interpretation is in no sense a ‘post hoc rationalizatio[n]’ advanced by 
an agency seeking to defend past agency action against attack.”40 There 
was “no reason to suspect that the interpretation [did] not reflect the 
agency’s fair and considered judgment.”41 And lastly, the Court rejected 
the respondents’ argument that the Secretary’s regulation should be 
construed narrowly against the employer. According to the Court, that 
rule of construction governed only judicial interpretations of statutes 
and regulations, and should not be applied as a “limitation on the 
Secretary’s power to resolve ambiguities in his own regulations.”42 
Because the Secretary is subject only to the limits prescribed by statute, 
he can write regulations “as broadly as he wishes,” and “[a] rule 
requiring the Secretary to construe his own regulations narrowly would 
make little sense.”43 
 
34. Auer, 519 U.S. at 457. 
35. Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43). 
36. Id. at 457–58. 
37. Id. at 461 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 
332, 359 (1989)). 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 462. 
40. Id. (first alteration added) (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 
488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988)). 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 463. 
43. Id. 
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After delivering the unanimous Auer opinion, however, Scalia 
himself sought to limit the breadth of discretion this rule granted to 
agencies.44 And over the coming years, the criticisms continued to 
accumulate, pushing against the increased discretion agencies gained 
under federal courts’ application of Auer.45 Indeed, legislators, commen–
tators, and Supreme Court justices have mounted a number of challen–
ges to Auer deference.46 One of those challenges is that the doctrine 
creates the opportunity for agencies to expand their own authority by 
intentionally promulgating ambiguous regulations, granting themselves 
greater leeway in the permissible range of meanings the language of the 
regulation can bear.47 Others suggest that deferring to an agency’s 
interpretation that it advances for the first time during litigation 
implicates due-process concerns because litigants do not have a fair 
warning of the agency’s position.48 And even still, some argue that Auer 
permits agencies to both create and interpret the law, implicating 
separation-of-power principles.49 
 
44. See Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 69 (2011) (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (expressing interest in revisiting Auer). 
45. Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court 2016 Term: Foreword: 1930s 
Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 24–
26 (2017); see also Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2446–47 (2019) 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“[T]he explosive growth of the administrative 
state over the last half-century has exacerbated Auer’s potential for 
mischief.”); Paul J. Larkin Jr. and Elizabeth H. Slattery, The World After 
Seminole Rock and Auer, 42 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 625, 629–30 
(2019) (noting “considerable pushback” against the administrative state 
and the delegation of “law-interpreting power” to administrative 
agencies). 
46. See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210–11 (2015) 
(Alito, J., concurring) (inviting the opportunity to reconsider Auer’s 
underlying precedent because it “may be incorrect”); Decker v. Northwest 
Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 615–16 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) 
(noting an interest in reconsidering Auer and Seminole Rock deference in 
a future case); Talk Am., Inc., 564 U.S. at 69 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(same); Johnathan H. Adler, Challenging Administrative Power: Auer 
Evasions, 16 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1, 14 (2018) (arguing that Auer 
violates separation-of-power principles); Ronald A. Cass, Auer Deference: 
Doubling Down on Delegations’ Defects, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 531, 535 
(2018) (arguing that Auer deference allows agencies to expand their 
authority by promulgating ambiguous regulations).  
47. Cass, supra note 46, at 535–36. 
48. See, e.g., id. at 535; see also Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Polgoriler, 
Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1449, 1464 (2011) 
(noting that deference to informally adopted interpretive rules allows 
“agencies to issue binding legal norms while escaping both procedural 
constraints and meaningful judicial scrutiny.”). 
49. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 46, at 14; Cass, supra note 46, at 536; 
Manning, supra note 10, at 631–654; see also Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 1·2019 
A New Auer 
223 
But in June 2019, the Supreme Court addressed these concerns in 
Kisor v. Wilkie, choosing to re-affirm Auer while at the same time 
purporting to limit its scope. This Comment addresses the Court’s 
reformulation of Auer and anticipates its implications for the future of 
administrative law. Part I sets forth the facts of Mr. Kisor’s story and 
the underlying legal proceedings. Part II addresses the Court’s reform–
ulation of Auer in Kisor v. Wilkie. And Part III analyzes what this 
decision means for the future of judicial deference to agencies’ 
interpretations of regulations. Specifically, Part III argues that although 
the Court re-affirmed Auer, its re-formulation of the doctrine may still 
lead to the demise of judicial deference to agency interpretations of 
regulations. 
I. The Underlying Proceedings 
In December of 1982, Mr. Kisor first filed a claim with the 
Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Portland, Oregon for 
disability compensation benefits for PTSD.50 Despite receiving a PTSD 
diagnosis from a counselor at the local veterans center, the regional 
office denied his claim for benefits after an examiner diagnosed Mr. 
Kisor with intermittent explosive disorder and atypical personality 
disorder rather than PTSD.51 Mr. Kisor initiated an appeal but failed 
to perfect it, and the Regional Office’s decision became final.52 
On June 5, 2006, Mr. Kisor submitted a request to reopen his 
previously denied claim for PTSD. This time, an examiner diagnosed 
Mr. Kisor with PTSD.53 While his request was pending, he submitted 
new evidence, including a 2007 psychiatric report diagnosing him with 
PTSD, a copy of his Department of Defense Form 214, a Combat 
History, Expeditions, and Awards Record, and the February 1983 letter 
from the Portland regional office.54 The regional office granted Mr. 
Kisor’s compensation for PTSD and assigned a fifty-percent disability 
rating, effective as of June 5, 2006, the date he reopened his request.55 
Mr. Kisor filed a notice of disagreement, challenging both the disability 
 
Challenging Administrative Power: Revisiting Seminole Rock, 16 Geo. J. 
L. & Pub. Pol’y 87, 90–91 (2018) (noting various criticisms of Auer 
deference). 
50. Kisor v. McDonald, No. 14-2811, 2016 WL 337517, at *1 (Vet. App., Jan. 
27, 2016). 
51. Kisor v. Shulkin, 869 F.3d 1360, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2017), vacated sub 
nom. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019). 
52. Id. at 1362. 
53. Id.  
54. Id.  
55. Id.  
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rating and its effective date.56 While he was successful at increasing his 
disability rating to seventy percent, the regional office refused to 
designate an earlier effective date.57 Mr. Kisor then appealed to the 
Board of Veterans’ Appeals (the “Board”), arguing that he was entitled 
to an effective date that was the same as the date of his initial claim 
that was denied in May 1983.58 Mr. Kisor also argued that the new 
evidence he provided demonstrated that the 1983 decision was the 
result of clear and unmistakable error.59 The Board rejected Mr. Kisor’s 
arguments on the basis that the 1983 decision was rendered final when 
he failed to perfect his appeal.60 The Board also held that the new 
evidence did not demonstrate clear and unmistakable error.61 
Mr. Kisor then appealed the Board’s decision to the United States 
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.62 Mr. Kisor argued that the 
Board misapplied 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c) when considering whether his 
new evidence demonstrated clear and unmistakable error in the 1983 
decision.63 This regulation governs the ability of a veteran to “reopen a 
finally adjudicated claim by submitting new and material evidence.”64 
Mr. Kisor sought to reopen his initial claim by submitting service 
department records in accordance with § 3.156(c), the regulation’s 
subdivision addressing service department records.65 Section 3.156(c) 
provides that the Department of Veterans Affairs may reconsider a 
previously adjudicated claim upon the receipt of “relevant official 
service department records that existed and had not been associated 
with the claims file when VA first decided the claim.”66 Generally, when 
a previously denied claim is reopened and granted based on new 
evidence, the effective date of the benefits will be either the date the 
claimant filed the application to reopen the claim or the date the 
entitlement arose, whichever is later.67 But when a previously denied 
claim is reopened and granted based on newly discovered service 
 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 1362–63. 
58. Id. at 1363.  
59. Id.  
60. Id. 
61. Kisor v. McDonald, No. 14-2811, 2016 WL 337517, at *1 (Vet. App., Jan. 
27, 2016). 
62. See generally id. 
63. Id. at *1. 
64. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) (2019). 
65. Kisor, 2016 WL 337517, at *3; see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c) (2019). 
66. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(1) (2019). 
67. Kisor, 2016 WL 337517, at *2. 
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department records, the effective date may be as early as the date of 
the original claim.68 Mr. Kisor believed he was entitled to the 1982 
effective date because his new evidence constituted newly discovered 
service records.69 
Even though Mr. Kisor submitted new service department records, 
the Board did not apply § 3.156(c) because it determined that the new 
records were not relevant within the meaning of the regulation.70 
According to the Board’s position, the service department records could 
be relevant only if they “would suggest or better yet establish that [Mr. 
Kisor] has PTSD as a current disability.”71 Because the new service 
records established only that Mr. Kisor experienced a traumatic event 
during service and did not establish that he had PTSD, the “documents 
were not outcome determinative in that they [did] not manifestly 
change [the] outcome of the decision.”72 The crux of the 1983 decision 
was whether Mr. Kisor warranted a diagnosis of PTSD, not whether he 
engaged in combat during service.73 As a result, the court affirmed the 
Board’s decision.74 
Mr. Kisor then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, arguing that the Veterans Court misinterpreted the term 
“relevant” in § 3.156(c)(1).75 The court began its analysis by identifying 
the grounds upon which it may “set aside an interpretation of a 
regulation”: when the interpretation is “(A) arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) 
contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in 
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or in violation 
of a statutory right; or (D) without observance of procedure required 
by law.”76 
The court first considered Mr. Kisor’s interpretation. Mr. Kisor 
argued that to be relevant under the regulation, a service department 
record need only have “any tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable 
 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id.  
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at *3.  
75. Kisor v. Shulkin, 869 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2017), vacated sub nom. 
Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019). 
76. Id. (citing 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1)(A)–(D) (2012); Sursely v. Peake, 551 
F.3d 1351, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
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or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”77 According to 
Mr. Kisor’s position, his service department records were relevant 
because they demonstrated that he experienced “the trauma of combat” 
and was exposed “to an in-service stressor.”78 The government, on the 
other hand, maintained that the Board and the Veterans Court inter–
preted the regulation correctly. According to the government, whether 
a service department record is relevant under the regulation “depends 
upon the particular claim and the other evidence of record.”79 The 
government further proffered that “if a record is one that the VA had 
no obligation to consider because it would not have mattered in light 
of the other evidence, then it cannot trigger reconsideration.”80 Even 
more, the government insisted that whether Mr. Kisor experienced an 
in-service stressor was not at issue in the 1983 decision; rather, the basis 
for the denial was that he did not have a diagnosis of PTSD.81 
The Federal Circuit ultimately affirmed the Veterans Court’s 
decision, holding that it did not misinterpret the regulation.82 The court 
justified its conclusion with a string of cases espousing the rule of Auer 
deference. Specifically, the court stated, “[a]s a general rule, we defer to 
an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation ‘as long as the reg–
ulation is ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation is neither plainly 
erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulation.’”83 In applying this rule, 
the court first concluded that the regulation was ambiguous because 
“the regulation is vague as to the scope of the word, and canons of 
construction do not reveal its meaning.”84 The court also noted that 
“[t]he varying, alternative definitions of the word ‘relevant’ offered by 
the parties further underscore[d] [the regulation’s] ambiguity.”85 After 
finding the regulation ambiguous, the court’s “only remaining question” 
was whether the Board’s interpretation was “‘plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent’ with the VA’s regulatory framework.”86 On this point, the 
court briefly asserted that “[t]he Board’s interpretation does not strike 
 
77. Id. at 1366 (quoting Claimant-Appellant’s Brief at 9–10, Kisor, 869 F.3d 
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (No. 16-1929)). 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. (quoting Brief for Respondent-Appellee at 15, Kisor, 869 F.3d 1360 
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (No. 16-1929)). 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 1367. 
83. Id. (quoting Gose v. U.S. Postal Serv., 451 F.3d 831, 836 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 1368 (quoting Long Island Care at Home v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 171 
(2007)). 
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us as either plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the VA’s regulatory 
framework.”87 But Mr. Kisor’s interpretation, on the other hand, was 
not probative as to the issue of whether he had a PTSD diagnosis in 
1982, and as such, the court saw “no plain error in the Board’s con–
clusion that the records were not ‘relevant’ for the purposes of 
§ 3.156(c)(1).”88 Because it saw “no error” in the Board’s interpretation, 
the court affirmed.89 
Mr. Kisor petitioned for a panel rehearing and a rehearing en banc, 
both of which the Federal Circuit denied.90 Three Federal Circuit judges 
dissented, however, taking issue with the fact that the court resolved 
the case based on Auer “despite the Supreme Court’s repeated reminder 
that statutes concerning veterans are to be construed liberally in favor 
of the veteran.”91 Admitting that the Federal Circuit was in no position 
to overrule Auer, the dissent insisted that where Auer conflicts with a 
substantive canon of construction, such as the one in Mr. Kisor’s case, 
Auer must give way.92 Concluding that “[g]ranting Auer deference to 
VA regulations conflicts directly with the moral principles underlying 
the veterans benefit system,” the dissent suggested that were it not for 
Auer, the regulation’s ambiguity would have been resolved in Mr. 
Kisor’s favor.93 
Mr. Kisor then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on June 29, 
2018, asking the Supreme Court to overturn Auer and Seminole Rock, 
or alternatively, to hold that Auer deference should yield to a 
substantive canon of construction.94 Mr. Kisor contended that his case 
presented the appropriate vehicle for the Court to review Auer 
deference because the Federal Circuit’s application of Auer was 
outcome-determinative in his case.95 He further posited that criticisms 
of Auer coming from current Supreme Court justices, as well as several 
Supreme Court decisions narrowing Auer’s scope, had led to substantial 
confusion in the lower courts, and that the Court should decide, once 
and for all, if courts must defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own 
 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 1369. 
90. Kisor v. Shulkin, 880 F.3d 1378, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
91. Id. at 1379 (O’Malley, J., dissenting). 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 1382. 
94. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2, Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 
(2019) (No. 18-15). 
95. Id. at 3. 
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regulation.96 After all, as Mr. Kisor admitted, the rule is important97: 
with the administrative state “touch[ing] almost every aspect of daily 
life,”98 “[t]he growth of the administrative state has compounded Auer’s 
practical implications.”99  
Mr. Kisor further distinguished his case from other previous 
petitions challenging Auer. For one thing, the outcome of his case 
depended entirely on the Federal Circuit’s application of Auer.100 For 
another, the Department of Veterans Affairs was actually a party to 
the litigation, directly implicating the criticism that an agency should 
not be able to invoke Auer to resolve a dispute in its own favor.101 No 
recent policy decisions had rendered the underlying issue moot, and Mr. 
Kisor posited that he was substantially likely to prevail on remand 
should the Federal Circuit apply a de novo standard of review.102 
Finding Mr. Kisor’s petition compelling, the Court granted review as 
to Mr. Kisor’s first question: whether the Court should overturn 
Auer.103 
II. The New Auer 
Although not convinced by Mr. Kisor’s calls to abandon the 
doctrine entirely, the Court vacated and remanded the Federal Circuit’s 
decision to be reconsidered under a newly clarified and limited Auer. 
While unanimous in the judgment, the Court was far from unified on 
its underlying rationale. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the 
Court, which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined in full.104 
Chief Justice Roberts concurred in part.105 Justice Gorsuch concurred 
in the judgment only, challenging every element of Kagan’s analysis.106 
Justice Thomas joined Gorsuch’s concurrence in full; Justices Kavan–
augh and Alito joined Gorsuch’s concurrence in part.107 And even still, 
 
96. Id. at 10–14. 
97. Id. at 13. 
98. Id. at 14 (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight 
Bd., 462 U.S. 477, 499 (2010)). 
99. Id. at 13. 
100. Id. at 19. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 20. 
103. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 657 (2018). 
104. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2407 (2019). 
105. Id. at 2424 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
106. See id. at 2425–48 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
107. Id. at 2425. 
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Kavanaugh wrote his own opinion concurring in the judgment, which 
Alito joined.108 
Justice Kagan’s opinion proceeds in four main parts, including a 
Part I, Part II-A, Part II-B, Part III-A, Part III-B, and Part IV.109 Only 
Parts I, II-B, III-B, and IV had a majority vote, and thus, the remaining 
parts may not properly be considered the opinion of the Court.110 Not 
surprisingly, the Parts receiving the majority vote are the least 
contentious.111 In response, Gorsuch devoted twenty-three pages to 
challenging Auer on multiple grounds, including arguing that it violates 
the Administrative Procedure Act and separation-of-power principles.112 
He also argued that the Court did not in fact adhere to the doctrine of 
stare decisis in the way it “reshap[ed]” Auer in “new and experimental 
ways.”113 Because the competing arguments for and against overturning 
Auer deference are outside the scope of this Comment, the following 
subsections address only those portions of the opinion that set forth the 
new limits imposed on Auer deference. 
A. The Opinion of the Court 
The Court’s recitation of Mr. Kisor’s case does not differ materially 
from how it was summarized above.114 Indeed, the particular facts of 
Mr. Kisor’s story have little, if any, bearing on the way in which the 
Court formed its articulation of Auer. Part II-B of the Court’s opinion, 
however, provides specific directions for how courts should apply Auer 
going forward.115 In fact, within two months of the Court issuing its 
opinion, lower courts had already cited to Part II-B in at least fifteen 
cases.116 Ultimately, a majority of five justices agreed that Auer’s scope 
 
108. Id. at 2448 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
109. Id. at 2407 (majority opinion). 
110. Id. 
111. Part I merely recites the facts and procedural history of Mr. Kisor’s case. 
Id. at 2408–10. Part II-B sets forth limitations on Auer’s scope and appli–
cation. Id. at 2414–18. Part III-B applies the doctrine of stare decisis, 
under which the Court prefers to adhere to precedent in the absence of a 
special justification. Id. at 2422–23. And Part IV concludes that the 
Federal Circuit failed to properly apply Auer, and thus its decision should 
be vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of the Court’s 
opinion. Id. at 2423–24. Parts II-A and III-A, on the other hand, frame 
Auer deference as a principle of legislative intent and argue that Auer was 
properly decided in the first place. See id. at 2410–14, 2418–22. 
112. See id. at 2425–48 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
113. Id. at 2443–44. 
114. See id. at 2408–09 (majority opinion). 
115. See id. at 2414–18.  
116. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 694 (9th Cir. 2019); 
Winding Creek Solar LLC v. Peterman, 932 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2019); 
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required limitation. Justice Kagan implemented those limitations by 
articulating Auer as a three-step process. First, courts must determine 
whether the regulation is “genuinely ambiguous” by “exhaust[ing] all 
the ‘traditional tools’ of construction.”117 Kagan encouraged courts to 
tackle the “hard interpretive conundrums” of complex rules, and to 
cease only when the “legal toolkit is empty.”118 She instructed courts to 
“‘carefully consider[ ]’ the text, structure, history, and purpose of a 
regulation, in all the ways [they] would if [they] had no agency to fall 
back on.”119 If courts try this hard, she suggested, they may “resolve 
many seeming ambiguities” without resorting to Auer deference.120 
Second, if a court concludes that the regulation is “genuinely 
ambiguous,” it must determine whether the agency’s interpretation falls 
within “the zone of ambiguity the court has identified after employing 
all its interpretive tools.”121 The court’s previous ambiguity inquiry 
should guide its analysis under this second step in that “[t]he text, 
structure, history, and so forth . . . establish the outer bounds of 
permissible interpretation.”122 
And under the third step, Kagan emphasizes that not all agency 
interpretations surviving to this point should receive Auer deference. 
 
Laturner v. United States, 933 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Howell 
v. Advantage RN, LLC, No. 17-CV-883 JLS (BLM), 2019 WL 3858896, 
at *8 (S.D. Ca. Aug. 16, 2019); Belt v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 
No. 18-3831, 2019 WL 3829459, at *11–13, *15–16 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 
2019); United States v. Brace, No. 1:17-cv-00006 (BR), 2019 WL 3778394, 
at *20–21 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2019); Mayo Clinic v. United States, No. 
16-cv-03113 (ECT/KMM), 2019 WL 3574709, at *4 (Dist. Minn. Aug. 6, 
2019); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 
Nos. CV-17-00475-TUC-JAS (L), CV-17-00576-TUC-JAS (C), CV-18-
00189-TUC-JAS (C), 2019 WL 3503330, at *9 (Dist. Ariz. July 31, 2019); 
East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 385 F. Supp. 3d 922, 939 (N.D. 
Ca. 2019); Braeburn Inc. v. United States FDA, 389 F. Supp. 3d 1, 19–
20, 23 (Dist. D.C. 2019); Trawler Carolina Lady, Inc. v. Ross, No. 4:19-
CV-19-FL, 2019 WL 3213537, at *13 (E.D.N.C. July 16, 2019); Sagarwala 
v. Cissna, 387 F. Supp. 3d. 56, 67 (Dist. D.C. 2019); Hyland v. Navient 
Corp., No. 18cv9031(DLC), 2019 WL 2918238, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 
2019); Spencer v. Macado’s, Inc., No. 6:18-cv-00005, 2019 WL 2931304, 
at *5–6 (W.D. Va. July 8, 2019); May v. Azar, Nos. 2180004, 2180033, 
2019 WL 3521136, at *11 (Ala. App. Aug. 2, 2019); E. Or. Mining Ass’n 
v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 365 Or. 313, 347, 352–53, 363–66 (Or. 2019). 
117. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)). 
118. Id. 
119. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 
501 U.S. 680, 707 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 2415–16. 
122. Id. at 2416. 
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Rather, “a court must make an independent inquiry into whether the 
character and context of the agency interpretation entitles it to 
controlling weight.”123 Declining to set forth an exhaustive test for when 
deference is appropriate, the Court provides three “markers” for 
identifying when an agency’s permissible interpretation of a genuinely 
ambiguous regulation warrants deference. First, the interpretation must 
represent the agency’s “authoritative” or “official” position rather than 
an “ad hoc statement not reflecting the agency’s views.”124 The Court 
clarifies, though, that the interpretation must not necessarily flow 
directly from the Secretary or his or her chief advisors; rather, it “must 
at least emanate from those actors, using those vehicles, understood to 
make authoritative policy in the relevant context.”125 Examples of 
interpretations failing this requirement include a speech by a mid-level 
official, an informal memorandum recounting a conversation, or 
regulatory guides that an agency has directly rejected as 
authoritative.126 Second, the interpretation must implicate the agency’s 
expertise.127 This marker is based on the assumption that agencies have 
a more “nuanced understanding of the regulations they administer.”128 
And if an agency “has no comparative expertise in resolving a 
regulatory ambiguity, Congress presumably would not grant it that 
authority.”129 And third, the agency’s interpretation must reflect “fair 
and considered judgment.”130 Thus, “convenient litigating position[s]” 
and “post hoc rationalizatio[ns]” are not entitled to deference under 
Auer.131 Additionally, Auer deference is not warranted when the agency 
advances a new interpretation that would create “unfair surprise” to 
affected parties.132 
In sum, an agency interpretation deserves Auer deference when (1) 
it is genuinely ambiguous; (2) it falls within the “zone of ambiguity”; 
and (3) the interpretation reflects the agency’s fair and considered 
judgment. With this new formulation in mind, the Court determined 
 
123. Id. 
124. Id. (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 257 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)).  
125. Id. at 2417. 
126. Id.  
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 
(2012).  
131. Id. (quoting Christopher, 567 U.S. at 155). 
132. Id. at 2417–18 (quoting Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 
158, 170 (2006).  
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that the doctrine of stare decisis “cuts strongly against” overturning 
Auer and its “long line of precedents.”133 It was not enough that “[t]he 
administrative state has evolved substantially since 1945,” as Mr. Kisor 
argued.134 And consequently, the most the Court was willing to do, as 
Kagan put it, was “reinforce the limits of Auer.”135 
Finally, the Court applied the newly limited Auer to Mr. Kisor’s 
case, holding that the Federal Circuit must reconsider its application of 
Auer in light of the Court’s opinion.136 Not only did the Federal Circuit 
fail to exhaust every interpretive tool in finding the regulation ambig–
uous, it did not determine whether the agency’s interpretation was of 
the kind that Congress intended courts to defer to.137 On remand, the 
Federal Circuit is to “make a conscientious effort to determine,” based 
on the regulation’s “text, structure, history, and purpose,” whether it 
truly “has more than one reasonable meaning.”138 If it does, the court 
must then determine whether the Board of Veterans’ Appeals’ inter–
pretation “reflects the considered judgment of the agency as a whole.”139 
Only then will Mr. Kisor have a final determination as to the effective 
date of his disability benefits. 
B. Gorsuch’s Concurrence 
According to Justice Gorsuch, “[i]t should have been easy for the 
Court to say goodbye to Auer v. Robbins.”140 In his view, the Court 
created a new “zombified” version of Auer deference when it should 
have overruled the doctrine altogether.141 He disputed that stare decisis 
should apply to Auer at all because Auer “prescribe[s] an interpretive 
methodology governing every future dispute over the meaning of every 
regulation.”142 He then pointed out that the majority does not even 
retain Auer in its original form, but instead rejects the lower court’s 
faithful application of the doctrine.143 To Gorsuch, the majority’s 
“refinement” of Auer fails to gives lower courts a more “workable 
 
133. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2422 (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills, 572 U.S. 782, 
798 (2014)).  
134. Id. at 2423.  
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 2424.  
137. Id. at 2423–24. 
138. Id. at 2424. 
139. Id.  
140. Id. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 2444. 
143. Id. at 2445. 
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standard.”144 He attacked the “newly mandated inquiry into the 
‘character and context of the agency interpretation’” as “destined only 
to compound the confusion.”145 But Gorsuch did identify a “silver 
lining” in the majority’s reformulation. The requirement that courts 
“exhaust all the ‘traditional tools’ of construction” prior to considering 
whether to defer to the agency may absolve lower courts from ever 
having to defer under Auer.146 He further suggested that the lack of 
guidance under the final inquiry into the “character and context” of the 
interpretation grants courts sufficient leeway to avoid deferring to an 
agency interpretation that differs from what the court believes to be 
the best interpretation.147 
C. Roberts’s Concurrence in Part 
Chief Justice Roberts joined the majority opinion, but declined to 
join Parts II-A and III-A, which discuss Auer’s background and whether 
Auer was correctly decided in the first place.148 Agreeing that Auer 
should not be overruled but merely limited, Roberts wrote separately 
to “suggest that the distance between the majority and Justice Gorsuch 
is not as great as it may initially appear.”149 He compared the majority’s 
limitations on Auer deference—that “the agency’s interpretation must 
be reasonable and must reflect its authoritative, expertise-based, and 
fair and considered judgment; and the agency must take account of 
reliance interests and avoid unfair surprise”—to his proffered reasons 
why a court might defer to an agency’s interpretation: that “[t]he 
agency thoroughly considered the problem, offered a valid rationale, 
brought its expertise to bear, and interpreted the regulation in a manner 
consistent with earlier and later pronouncements.”150 But Roberts was 
careful to distinguish Auer deference from deference under Skidmore v. 
Swift & Co.,151 according to which a court defers to an agency’s 
interpretation that lacks the force and effect of law to the extent that 
the interpretation is persuasive.152 
 
144. Id.  
145. Id. at 2446. 
146. Id. at 2448.  
147. Id. at 2446. 
148. Id. at 2424 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
149. Id. 
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151. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
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D. Kavanaugh’s Concurrence 
Agreeing with Justice Gorsuch that Auer should be overruled, 
Justice Kavanaugh wrote separately to advance two additional points. 
Kavanaugh addressed the majority’s insistence that courts employ “all 
the ‘traditional tools’ of construction” in determining whether a 
regulation is genuinely ambiguous.153 According to Kavan–augh, courts 
“will almost always reach a conclusion about the best interpretation of 
the regulation at issue,” and as such, will have no need to defer to the 
agency under Auer.154 Because the only regulations to receive Auer 
deference will be those that employ broad terms such as “reasonable” 
or “practicable,” the result is a rule that resembles the one espoused in 
Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,155 under 
which an agency must provide a reasoned analysis when changing a 
rule.156 
III. Going Forward 
Before determining what Kisor v. Wilkie means for the future of 
Auer deference, a brief reminder of how the Court articulated Auer 
deference prior to Kisor is necessary. To recap, in Seminole Rock, the 
Court held that “the ultimate criterion” for determining the proper 
interpretation of an ambiguous regulation “is the administrative inter–
pretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”157 Then, the Auer Court 
held that courts should defer to the agency’s interpretation of the 
ambiguous regulation “so long as it is ‘based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.’”158 Thus, the agency’s interpretation of an 
ambiguous regulation is binding as long as it is a reasonable 
interpretation of the regulation, even if the agency’s interpretation is 
not the best or most natural interpretation.159 Now, after Kisor, courts 
should afford Auer deference to an agency’s interpretation of a 
“genuinely ambiguous” regulation when the agency’s interpretation 
“fall[s] within the bounds of reasonable interpretation” and when “the 
 
153.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2448 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
154. Id. 
155. 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
156. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2448 (Kavanaugh J., concurring); State Farm, 463 
U.S. at 42. 
157. Bowels v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). 
158. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). 
159. See Manning, supra note 10, at 627–28. 
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character and context of the agency interpretation entitles it to 
controlling weight.”160 
According to empirical studies, when courts apply Auer, they defer 
to agencies between seventy-four and ninety-one percent of the time.161 
Deference is likely to become far less frequent as courts have more 
opportunities to apply Kisor because fewer agency interpretations will 
receive deference under Auer. Each step of the reformulated Auer 
analysis provides courts with an opportunity to deny deference to the 
agency interpretation. And so Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh may 
be correct in their predictions that Kisor may be an end to judicial 
deference towards agency interpretations of regulations after all. 
First and foremost, not every ambiguous regulation is entitled to 
Auer deference, as fewer ambiguous regulations will survive the initial 
“genuine ambiguity” inquiry. Indeed, Justice Kagan and the majority 
sought to limit Auer’s scope by formulating the initial ambiguity 
inquiry as one in search of “genuine ambiguity.”162 As Justice Kavan–
augh predicts, the new Auer will likely reduce the frequency with which 
courts defer to agency interpretations because they will decide on the 
“best interpretation” of the regulation after employing all the 
traditional tools of construction.163 Indeed, district courts have already 
denied agency interpretations Auer deference on the basis that the 
regulation at issue was not genuinely ambiguous.164 In Laturner v. 
United States,165 the Federal Circuit was tasked with interpreting tax 
regulations governing U.S. savings bonds.166 The Federal Circuit 
 
160. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415–16. 
161. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: 
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from 
Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1099 (2008) (analyzing Supreme 
Court opinions that apply Auer deference from 1984–2004 and finding 
that the Court deferred to the agency 91% of the time); Richard J. Pierce, 
Jr. & Joshua Weiss, An Empirical Study of Judicial Review of Agency 
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 515, 519–20 (2011) 
(analyzing 219 district and circuit court cases from 1999–2001 and 2005–
2007 in which the courts applied Auer, finding that courts deferred to the 
agency 76% of the time); William Yeatman, An Empirical Defense of 
Auer Step Zero, 106 Geo. L.J. 515, 517, 519 (2018) (analyzing circuit 
court opinions applying Auer deference from 1993–2013, finding that 
courts deferred to the agency 74% of the time). 
162. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415. 
163. Id. at 2448. 
164. See, e.g., Laturner v. United States, 933 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2019); 
North Carolina Div. of Servs. for the Blind v. Dep’t of Educ., No. 1:17-
cv-1058, 2019 WL 3997009, at *13 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 23, 2019). 
165. 933 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
166. Id. at 1357–58. 
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concluded, after using “the ‘traditional tools’ of construction,” that the 
regulation was not genuinely ambiguous.167 The Laturner court relied 
mostly on the regulation’s plain language, recognizing that the 
Treasury’s proffered interpretation conflicted with exclusions elsewhere 
in the regulation.168 Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has already denied 
deference to an interpretation of an ambiguous regulation on the basis 
that the regulation was not genuinely ambiguous.169 
The initial ambiguity inquiry also now requires the court to 
determine whether both competing interpretations are reasonable. As 
Kagan posits, there is no reason to defer when there is only one 
reasonable construction of the regulation.170 She instructs courts to 
“‘carefully consider[ ]’ the text, structure, history, and purpose of a 
regulation, in all the ways it would if it had no agency to fall back 
on.”171 And whether a regulation is clear or ambiguous (or even 
genuinely ambiguous) can be entirely subjective depending upon what 
the judge determines constitutes “‘enough’ ambiguity.”172 As Justices 
Gorsuch and Kavanaugh predict, a rigorous application of the ambig–
uity inquiry may preclude deference in most circumstances. 
Also likely to limit the frequency with which courts defer to 
agencies under Auer is the requirement that the interpretation’s “char–
acter and context” entitles it to deference. Because the new Auer leaves 
the lower courts with only “markers” for determining when deference is 
appropriate, lower courts may take it upon themselves to identify 
additional reasons not to defer to an agency’s interpretation. District 
courts have already declined to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a 
genuinely ambiguous regulation based on the character and context of 
the interpretation.173 For example, in United States Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC) v. Byrnes,174 the district court judge 
explained that he could not defer to the CFTC’s new interpretation of 
 
167. Id. at 1362 (quoting Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415). 
168. Id. at 1363. 
169. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Comm’r, 934 F.3d 976, 992–93 (9th Cir. 2019). 
170. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415. 
171. Id. (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 707 (1991)). 
172. See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. 
Rev. 2118, 2136 (2016) (reviewing Robert A. Katzmann, Judging 
Statutes (2014)). 
173. See, e.g., United States CFTC v. Byrnes, No. 13-CV-1174 (VSB), 2019 
WL 4515209, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2019); Belt v. P.F. Chang’s China 
Bistro, Inc., No. 18-3831, 2019 WL 3829459, at *16–17 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 
2019); Spencer v. Macado’s Inc., No. 6:18-CV-00005, 2019 WL 2931304, 
at *6 (W.D. Va. July 8, 2019); Romer v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282, 293–94 (4th 
Cir. 2019); Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 693, 700 (9th Cir. 2019). 
174. No. 13-CV-1174 (VSB), 2019 WL 4515209. 
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a regulation because people in the industry had been relying on the 
previous interpretation for over twenty years.175 In Belt v. P.F. Chang’s 
China Bistro,176 the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the 
Department of Labor’s interpretation of a genuinely ambiguous 
regulation did not warrant deference because the interpretation was 
unreasonable and did not reflect the agency’s fair and considered 
judgment because the agency reversed a long-standing previous inter–
pretation.177 
And lastly, in granting certiorari to only Mr. Kisor’s first question, 
the Court did not address whether another substantive canon of 
construction should override Auer deference.178 This leaves room for the 
lower courts to avoid applying Auer deference by employing other 
substantive canons of construction to resolve an apparent ambiguity 
when exhausting all the traditional tools of construction. Nothing in 
the Court’s Kisor opinion appears to prevent the lower courts from 
doing so. Justice Kavanaugh alludes to this in his concurrence, 
suggesting that the only regulations to receive Auer deference going 
forward will be those with broad and inherently ambiguous terms such 
as “reasonable” or “practicable.”179 As such, lower court judges who still 
have a fundamental disagreement with Auer deference can avoid 
applying the doctrine as much as possible by engaging in a rigorous 
application of Justice Kagan’s first step and consulting other substan–
tive canons of construction to resolve ambiguities. 
IV. Conclusion 
Although the Court declined to abandon the Auer doctrine, Kisor 
v. Wilkie may prove a useful tool for judges and litigators to reduce the 
frequency with which courts defer to agencies. Indeed, multiple federal 
courts have already denied deference to agency interpretations of regul–
ations in the wake of Kisor, even denying Chevron deference to an 
agency interpretation of a statute because the statute was not “genuin–
ely ambiguous.”180 Auer may well be litigated into extinction, bringing 
an end to this long-contested, yet long-standing, doctrine. 
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